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Abstract
The e-cash scheme and the digital content transactions are the need of the hour. In the
coming years, all these digital transactions will grow tremendously. So, a secure e-cash
scheme is of utmost requirement. e-cash scheme, which is untraceable and maintains
the security features, make it possible for the customers and the merchants to exchange
the e-cash and the merchandise with privacy. So, there is a need to design an e-cash
scheme with strong cryptosystem and algorithms in order to facilitate efficient digital
transactions. There are two types of e-cash systems: Oﬄine e-cash systems and online
e-cash systems. Oﬄine e-cash systems make it possible for the customer to pay the
e-coin to the merchant without any involvement of bank. In online schemes, we require
the involvement of the bank. The two most fundamental security features associated
with oﬄine scheme is the anonymity and the double spending detection. The proposed
scheme maintains both the above features along with unforgeability. Besides, the e-coins
have their expiration date so that the bank faces no hassles and can manage its database
efficiently. This feature also ensures portability as the coins can be transferred to storage
devices through the networks.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Since the world of digitalization is first evolving, the speed of the communication and
processing of data have been increasing. So in the area of payments, we need to have
a strong and secure e-cash scheme that allows fast payments and can greatly reduce
the time of communication. These scheme helps the customers and the merchants to
exchange the e-coin and the merchandise in a secure communication channel. But despite
of the advantages of the e-cash scheme, e-cash system is not being used everywhere
because of non-availability of resources. Traditional cash is still persistent in many areas.
One reason may be that we need to have sufficient investment on the infrastructure so
that the new e-cash scheme offers considerable pros over traditional cash. So, in order
to cope with this world of digitalization, we need to design an e-cash scheme with
strong cryptosystem and security features embedded in it so that they can replace the
traditional cash and foster faster electronic payments.
In present day most of the communication takes place on the insecure channel which
makes the message vulnerable to multiple threats. On the other hand creating a secure
channel is quite expensive and not scalable. While sending a message over an insecure
channel such as internet to a person we must primarily provide four different security
requirements such as [2, 3],
 Confidentiality: Protection our information from malicious actions.
 Integrity: Changes need to be done by only authorized entities.
 Authentication: Able to know the identity of sender.
 Non-repudiation: Either party can’t deny their role later.
Cryptography only allows data confidentiality but can’t allow data integrity, data au-
thentication and Non-repudiation.
1
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1.1 Introduction to Cryptography
Cryptography is the science of secret writing i.e. the science of transforming information
to make them secure and immune attacks. Cryptography refers to the encryption and de-
cryption of messages using symmetric-key encipherment, asymmetric-key encipherment
and hashing.
1.1.1 Symmetric Key Cryptography
In this, sender will encrypt the message using encryption algorithm and receiver decrypts
using decryption algorithm. Here both encryption and decryption algorithm uses same
secret key. In the simplest way Alice puts the message in a box and locks the box using
the shared secret key, Bob unlocks the box with the same key and takes out the message
[2, 3]. Additive cipher, Affine cipher, Playfair cipher, Hill cipher etc. are the examples
of Symmetric Key Cryptography.
1.1.2 Asymmetric Key Cryptography
In this, sender will encrypt the message using encryption algorithm using receiver’s
public key and receiver decrypts using decryption algorithm using receiver’s private key.
So we need two keys one is public key and other one is private key. RSA cryptosys-
tem, Rabin cryptosystem, Elgamal cryptosystem are the examples of ASymmetric Key
Cryptography.
1.1.3 Hashing
In hashing, a fixed length message digest is created out of a variable length message.
Both digest and message is sent to receiver. It provides data integrity [20].
1.2 Digital Signature
A conventional Signature is included in the document. When we sign a document digi-
tally, we send the signature as a separate document. The sender sends two documents:
the message and the signature. The receipient receives both documents and verifies
that the signature belongs to the supposed sender. The sender uses a signing algorithm
with his private key and the receiver uses a verifying algorithm with sender’s public key.
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It provides message authentication, message integrity, nonrepudiation and confidential-
ity.Digital signature was first proposed by Diffie and Hellman[4].
1.3 Time-Stamp
Time-stamping is a technique for providing proof of existence of certain digital document
or data prior to a specific time [5]. Time-stamping is now widely recognized as an
important mechanism used to ensure the integrity of digital data. Time-stamping is
highly required in many domains like patent submissions, electronic votes or electronic
commerce. Time-stamping is usually enforced to ensure non-repudiation. A digital
signature can only be legally binding if it was made when the user’s certificate was still
valid, and a time-stamp on a signature can successfully prove this
1.4 Classification of e-cash System
e-cash system can be classified as oﬄine or online [1].
1.4.1 Oﬄine e-cash
In oﬄine e-cash system customer pays merchant with out help of bank means there is
no role of bank during transaction but during deposit merchant will deposit the e-coin
in the bank.
1.4.2 Online e-cash
When customer pays merchant, bank should be online means presence of bank is needed
during payment. In online e-cash system all participants should be online.
1.5 Basic operations of e-cash
e-cash system contains four basic operations such as:
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1.5.1 Key Generation
This includes the key generation by the Bank. Bank will generate the public keys and
private keys. They are used in cryptography and Digital signature. Bank will publish the
public key publicly such that all the customers and merchants can use those keys. Bank
wont share the private keys rather it will store and use those keys for decryption[1, 18].
1.5.2 Payment
In this phase the merchant gets the e-coin. Customer will purchase some goods, create
e-coin and gives to merchant[1, 18].
1.5.3 Deposit
In this phase the merchant deposits the e-coin in the Bank. So that the amount of pur-
chase will be deducted from the customer’s account and credited to merchant’s account.
1.5.4 Tracing
In this phase the e-coin is traced whether it is ready to use or not by customer.
1.6 Applications
e-cash systems replace the traditional system. Payments less than “one” is possible
through e-cash systems. e-cash systems are used in online banking systems; they are
also used for online shopping and other purposes. There are many features those can be
achieved by e-cash System such as[1]
 Transferability: Electronic coins can be circulated among people regardless of
whether the transactions are online of off-line.
 Portability: The security and use of digital cash is not dependent on any physical
location. The cash can be transferred through computer networks into storage
devices and vice versa
 Off-line Payment: The transaction can be done off-line, meaning no communication
with the central bank is needed during the transaction.
 Unforgeability: Only authorized parties (i.e. the bank) can produce digital coins.
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 Anonymity: The spender of the cash must remain anonymous. If the coin is spend
legitimately, neither the recipient nor the bank can identify the spender.
 Unreusability: The digital cash cannot be copied and reused. Then we have to
minimize the risks for forgery and establish a good authenticity system.
 Divisibility: Digital cash can be divided into smaller amounts.
1.7 Preliminaries
1.7.1 Discrete Logarithm Problem
Let ‘G’ be a cyclic group of order ‘q’ with a generator ‘g’. Equivalently, for every h
belongs to G, there is a unique X belongs to Zq such that g
x=h and x is called the
discrete logarithm of h with respect to g. The discrete logarithm assumption states that
there exists a group G such that computing the discrete logarithm is hard and hence
we have the discrete logarithm problem (DLP for short) [6]. In simplest form let y=gx
mod(n), if g, n and x are given we can easily find out y, but if y, g and n are given then
it is very hard to find out x. This is Discrete Logarithm problem.
for example: x=92∗i+1 mod 10 and y=92∗i mod 10 , where i=0,1,2,...
If i is given then we can easily evaluate x or y but if x or y is given then it is very difficult
to find i[19].
1.7.2 Integer Factorization Problem
Integer Factorization as a Decision Problem, given two integers A, k. Does there exist
a prime number p such that 2 < p < k and p completely divides A ?[7]
“YES” instance => we can find a prime number p that satisfies the above requirements
“NO” instance => we cannot find any prime number that satisfies above requirements.
Clearly Integer Factorization is in NP. Integer Factorization lies in NP, but we don’t
know exactly how hard it is. In simplest form let n=p*q, if p and q are given then
we can find n easily but if n is given to find out p and q is very hard. This is Integer
Factorization Problem.
for example: 100 can be factorized as 20*5, 10*10, 5*5*4, 5*5*2*2, etc. so we can’t say
they should factorize this way.
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1.7.3 Safe Primes
These primes are called ”safe” because of their relationship to strong primes. A prime
number is a strong prime if q + 1 and q − 1 both have large prime factors[8]. For a safe
prime,q = 2 ∗ p ∗ f + 1 , the integer p is a large prime factor. Here q always can’t be
prime for example if p=f=2, q=9 is not a prime. So we have to test whether it is prime
or not. If q is a safe prime then the order of multiplicative subgroup will be very large.
1.8 Objective
The objective of ours is to produce an e-cash scheme which satisfies all the properties like
double spending detection, anonymity, unforgeability, unreusability, tracing and divis-
ibility; this scheme will facilitate online payment and will mantain the above features.
Moreover the proposed scheme attaches expiration date to coins so that the banking
system can manage its databases more efficiently. The coins produced by the scheme
can be transferred through computer networks into storage devices and vice versa so
that portability is assured.
1.9 Contribution
We have proposed an oﬄine scheme which is untraceable, maintains the double spend-
ing, unforgeability; and maintains portability, divisibility. Moreover, it can withstand
CCA(chosen cipher text attacks).
1.10 Outline of Thesis
The protocol of e-cash system is proposed in chapter 2. All the implementation details
are described in chapter 3. All the security analysis are described in chapter 4. we
propose the conclusion in the chapter 5.
Chapter 2
Proposed oﬄine e-cash Protocol
The e-cash system consists of 4 participants :
 Customer: Customer buys goods or stuffs and gives e-coin to merchant rather
giving cash or cheque.
 Merchant: Merchant takes e-coin from the customer and deposits into the bank
where the purchase amount will be deducted from customer’s account and credited
to merchant’s account.
 Bank: Bank tracks all the transaction between merchant and customer, all the
details of customer and merchant.
 Clearing House: Clearing House is a third party, it publishes the public keys and
private keys for digital signature and cryptography.
The e-cash system also consists of 4 protocols :
 Account Opening Protocol: A new customer is added by taking a secret member-
ship key i.e W.
 Payment Protocol: A customer buys some e-coin from bank and gives merchant
so that he can purchase some goods.
 Deposit Protocol: A merchant deposits e-coin in the bank. Purchase amount will
be deducted from Customer’s account and credited into the merchant’s account.
 Tracing Protocol: A customer can trace an e-coin whether it has been used or not.
Before discussing the protocols we should do some system setups.
7
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2.1 System Setup
In this protocol, bank and clearing house create the public keys and private keys. They
publish the public key publicly. These are the following steps: [1, 17]
Step 1: Bank randomly chooses 3 prime numbers p′, q′ and f such that p = (2∗p′∗f+1)
and q = (2 ∗ q′ ∗ f + 1) are primes.
Step 2: Chooses e which is co-prime with both p− 1 and q − 1.
Step 3: Computes n = p ∗ q, φ(n)=(p− 1) ∗ (q − 1) and d=e−1 mod φ(n).
Step 4: Chooses g as a generator of n of order f .
Step 5: Clearing house chooses x in Zφ(n)∗ and computes Y=gx mod n.
Step 6: Publishes Public key(Y, g, n, e) , Private key (d, p, q, f, x).
Step 7: In Digital Signature signer signs with private key and verifier verifies with the
public key.
2.2 Account Opening Protocol
It involves protocol between the customer and the bank in which the customer gets the
secret membership key.
Step 1: The customer chooses random number a,α,β in Zn∗ and computes
δ=α*β mod(n)
Z=a*δ mod(n) and sends (δ,Z) to the bank.
Step 2: The bank computes w=Z * δ−1 mod n, sends w to the customer and stores
(w,Z) with the customer’s identity.
Step 3: The customer checks the authenticity by checking a ≡ w mod n and keeps (w,
δ,Z) as his secret membership key.
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2.3 Payment Protocol
It involves protocol between the customer and the merchant in which the customer pays
e-coin to merchant.
Step 1: The merchant generates a payment message M as follws and sends it to the
customer. M = H(Shopid, amountofpurchase, date).
Step 2: The customer requests a timestamp to the clearing house and obtains a times-
tamp t and chooses random number u in Zφ(n)∗ and sends u, t.
Step 3: The customer computes
S=Y e mod(n)
R1=S +M*g
u mod(n) and sends (S, R1 , t) to the clearing house.
Step 4: The clearing house checks the authenticity by verifying Sd =Y mod(n). If it
satisfies, then chooses a random number K in Zφ(n)∗ and computes
R2 = (k− R1 −t) mod φ(n)
R =( R1 −S) g−k mod n
S + l = x − 1( R2 −u+ R1 )mod φ(n) and sends (S + l, R, R1 , R2 , t) to the
customer.
Step 5: The customer computes l from the S+ l and selects µ in random and computes
ζ = gµx mod (n) and ψ=w∗ Y µ mod (n) and sends the e-coin(t, S,R, l, ζ,ψ) to
merchant.
Step 6: The merchant verifies the e-coin as per following condition M = R∗ Y (S+l) gt
mod n. If so merchant accepts the e-coin otherwise it is rejected
2.4 Deposit Protocol
It involves protocol between the merchant and bank in which the merchant deposits the
e-coin to the bank.
Step 1: The merchant sends the e-coin to the clearing house and the clearing house
computes w=ψ/ζ and sends w to the bank.
Step 2: Based on the identity w ,the bank determines the real identity of a customer.
Then deducts the money from the customer’s account and credits to the merchant.
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2.5 Tracing Protocol
It involves protocol between the customer and bank where customer needs to know
whether the e-coin has been used or not.
Step 1: Each e-coin is represented by 6-tuples and all tuples are uniquely define one
e-coin. So (t, S,R, l, ζ,ψ ) are the parameters of e-coin.
Step 2: Let E1 be an e-coin(t1,S1,R1,l1,ζ1,ψ1) and E2 be an e-coin(t2,S2,R2,l2,ζ2,ψ2).
Step 3: For E1 and E2 to be same all 6 tuples are to be same. t1=t2 can be possible
if they are generated at same time. S1=S2 can be possible as they depend on
Y ,i.e. R1=R2 can be possible if different customers buy same amount of purchase
from same merchant. (ζ1,ψ1)= (ζ2,ψ2) can be possible if they are same customers.
As same merchant can’t buy from same merchant at same time.So E1 is always
unique.
Step 4: After e-coin is used the tuples are stored in a database of used e-coin with date,
merchant name and customer name.
Step 5: When a customer comes to trace e-coin then the e-coin is matched against all
the used e-coins by the customer.
Step 6: If match is found then it will show that this e-coin has been already used at
this date, by this merchant.
Step 7: If match is not found then it will show that this e-coin has not been used.
2.6 Correctness of Protocol
There are two proofs of correctness
 Given: S = Y emod(n)
To prove: Sd = Y mod(n)
We know d = e−1modφ(n) => ed = 1modφ(n) => ed = k ∗ φ(n) + 1
S = Y emod(n)
=> Sd = Y edmod(n)
=> Sd = Y k∗φ(n)+1mod(n)
=> Sd = Y mod(n)
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 To prove: M = R ∗ Y (S+l) ∗ gtmodn.
Proof: R ∗ Y (S+l) ∗ gtmodn
= R ∗ gx(S+l)gtmodn
= R ∗ g(R2−u+R1)modφ(n) ∗ gtmodn
= (R1− S) ∗ g−k ∗ g(R2−u+R1)modφ(n) ∗ gtmodn
= M ∗ gu ∗ g−k ∗ g(R2−u+R1)modφ(n) ∗ gtmodn
= M ∗ g(R2−k+R1+t)modφ(n)modn
= M ∗ ga∗φ(n)modn = Mmodn, where a=0,1,2. . .
2.7 Why this protocol is called oﬄine
Let us discuss the Payment protocol. Initially Bank and clearing house generates the
public keys and private key which are required for all protocols.
Step 1: The customer purchases from the merchant and the merchant generates M.
Step 2: Now the customer requests clearing house for timestamp and gets it.
Step 3: Now the customer signs on the message. He sends both the sign and the
message.
Step 4: Now the clearing house verifies and sends some components of the e-coin.
Step 5: The customer creates an e-coin, which contains 6 tuples and sends the e-coin
to merchant.
Step 6: The merchant verifies the e-coin using verifying algorithm.
So in this whole process, the bank remains silent. There is no role of bank during
payment, that is why this e-cash system is called oﬄine e-cash system.
Chapter 3
Implementation Detail
3.1 Introduction to Implementation
Implementation contains three base classes. They are Project class, Cash class and
Deposit class. Project class initializes the public keys and private keys, opens account
of customer, modifies customers and deletes customer. Cash class gives opportunities
to the customer to buy the new e-coin, trace e-coin and view details of the customers.
Deposit class gives opportunities to the merchants to deposit the e-coin. The detail
implementations are given below :
3.2 Project Class
When we run this class a stylish frame will be generated as Figure 3.1 . After 3 seconds,
a Login page will be generated as Figure 3.2 . Bank Administrator will use this software
so that he can enter the corresponding username and the password. If the username
and password are valid and they match with the username and password pair in the
database, then the admin is accepted and the home page is generated. The home
page will be like Figure 3.3 . This will provide different operations to admin such as:
generating the public keys and private keys, adding new customer, deleting customer,
modification of the customer details and tracking of all the customer details. This class
uses key.properties, wname.properties and wbalance.properties files to store public keys,
private keys, the customer details(each customer contains w(secret key), name of the
customer, balance of the customer).
Now let us elaborate how different operations are done.
12
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Figure 3.1: Welcome bank page.
Figure 3.2: Login bank page.
Figure 3.3: Home page for the admin.
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3.2.1 Generation of Keys
The admin will click on a Key Generation button which makes the private and public
keys to be generated. They are stored in key.properties file. All the keys’ variables are
initialized.
3.2.2 Add Customer
If the admin clicks on Add Customer button, a new form will be generated where all the
details of customer will be filled and described as Figure 3.4. W i.e. a secret member
Figure 3.4: Add Customer for the admin.
key for a customer is generated and that is automatically filled. After clicking on add
button a new record of customer is added into database and to the table. If balance or
mobile field is filled with not integer, then an error frame is generated as described in
Figure 3.5.
3.2.3 Delete Customer
If the admin wants to delete some customers, then he should click on the customer
row which he wants to delete. After he clicks on the Delete customer button, the
corresponding customer will be deleted from the table and database. If he clicks on
Delete Customer before selecting any row, then an error frame will be generated as
described in Figure 3.6.
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Figure 3.5: Enter valid balance or mobile.
Figure 3.6: Select any row for the admin.
3.2.4 Modify Customer
If the admin wants to modify some details of customer, then he has to click on the
customer row which he wants to modify. After clicking on Modify customer button, a
new form will be generated as in Figure 3.7 where all the details will be given and the
admin can change some details and after clicking on modify button, all the details of
customer are changed in the database and the table. If he clicks on Modify Customer
before selecting any row, then an error frame will be generated as described in Figure
3.6.
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Figure 3.7: Modify Customer for the admin.
3.3 Cash Class
When we run this class a stylish frame will be generated as Figure 3.8 . After 3 seconds,
a Login page will be generated as Figure 3.9 . Customer will use this software so that
he can enter the corresponding username and password. If the username and password
are valid and they match with the username and password pair in the database, then
the customer is accepted and the home page is generated. The home page will be like
Figure 3.10. This class will provide operations for customer such as buy e-coin, trace
e-coin and view details.
3.3.1 Buy e-coin
In order to buy e-coin customer has to click on the merchant from whom he wants to
buy and enter the amount of purchase in buy field and click on buy button. A property
file will be generated which contains all the values of e-coin as described as Figure 3.11.
If he clicks on Buy button before selecting any row, then an error message is generated
showing that you have to select any row. If the balance is less than the purchase amount,
then also an error message is generated describing less balance.
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Figure 3.8: Welcome Page for the Customer.
Figure 3.9: Login page for Customer .
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Figure 3.10: Home Page for the Customer.
Figure 3.11: Buy e-coin Page for the Customer.
Chapter 3. Implementation Detail 19
3.3.2 Trace e-coin
In order to check whether an e-coin is used or not Customer can trace an e-coin by
clicking on Trace e-coin button. Then a new file chooser will be generated as Figure
3.12. Then it will show whether the e-coin can be used or already used.If the e-coin has
already been used, then an error frame will be displayed as described in Figure 3.14. If
the e-coin has not been used, then a frame will be displayed as described in 3.13.
Figure 3.12: Trace e-coin Page for the Customer.
Figure 3.13: Trace e-coin Page for the Customer.
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Figure 3.14: Trace e-coin Error for the Customer.
3.3.3 View Details
In order to check the balance, customer will click on view details button after which a
separate window will be generated as Figure 3.15. After checking balance, he can click
on ok button to make the frame to disappear.
Figure 3.15: View Details Page for the Customer.
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3.4 Deposit Class
When we run this class a stylish frame will be generated as Figure 3.16 . After 3 seconds,
a Login page will be generated as Figure 3.17 . Merchant will use this software to enter
corresponding username and password. If the username and password are valid and they
match with the username and password pair in the database, then only the merchant
is accepted and the home page is generated. The home page will be like Figure 3.18.
This class will provide operations for merchant such as deposit e-coin. He will deposit
e-coin by clicking on Deposit button, then a new form will be generated as described as
Figure 3.19. If he clicks on Deposit button a file chooser will be generated as described
as Figure 3.20. He chooses the properties file which he wants to deposit. If the e-coin
has not been used, then it will decoded and amount of purchase will be added to the
merchant balance and a copy of e-coin is added to e-coin database. If the merchant is
trying to use same e-coin multiple times then a ”double spending error” is generated
using e-coin database as described in Figure 3.21. If the merchant steals an e-coin from
other and tries to deposit, then also a ”you are not correct merchant error” is generated
using e-coin database as described in Figure 3.22. If the merchant changes the name of
the e-coin file, then also double spending is detected as described in Figure 3.21.
Figure 3.16: Welcome Page for the Merchant.
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Figure 3.17: Welcome Page for the Merchant.
Figure 3.18: Merchant Page for the Merchant.
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Figure 3.19: Deposit e-coin for the Merchant.
Figure 3.20: Choose e-coin for the Merchant.
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Figure 3.21: Double Spending for the Merchant.
Figure 3.22: Not Correct Merchant.
Chapter 4
Analysis of Proposed e-cash
scheme
In an oﬄine e-cash system, analysis of security features is one of the foremost jobs,
which needs to be carried out so to have better payment facilities between a payer and
payee; the analysis of e-cash system is done so that the e-cash can withstand the security
features like: unforgeability, double spending, anonymity and can achieve untraceability.
e-cash system is the way or the medium in which various protocols are implemented to
facilitate the payments between the consumer and the merchants. Merchants also can
deposit the e-coin to the bank and receive the payments from the customers. The analysis
is done so that it can ascertain the security flaws in a fair e-cash system. Moreover the
improved scheme after analysis also is resistant against threats and attacks. Anonymity,
unforgeability and double spending detection are the most important security features[1].
Our design of e-cash system should be such that it can withstand all the attacks from
the malicious programmers. However, since authorities such as banks and certificate
authorities may have important secret data of customers, the insiders in the potentially
untrusted authorities can become threats to electronic cash systems.
4.1 Security Features
The security features are broadly described below:
4.1.1 Anonymity
We execute the withdrawal protocol for spender S. The messages between the Spender
S and the Bank B is called Trans. A random bit b is chosen. If b=0, then a random valid
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coin coin0 is created. A is given coin, b , transcript and all the identity information
of S that the Bank has. A then output a bit b. The output is either a bit b or
0 otherwise. A adversary has the access to all the exchanged message between the
Spender and the Bank. We say that P achieves anonymity if the adversary succeeds
with probability that is at most negligibly greater than 1/2. To prove this, we first
note that Pr[b = 0] = Pr[b = 1] = 1/2. Coin has three attributes: Trans, Ids, coinx.
Using the three attributes, the adversary can identify if the coin is actual or random.
Distinguishing between these cases is equivalent to linking a coin to the spender and
violating anonymity[1].
Pr[ExpA] = 1/2 ∗ Pr[ExpA]b = 1 + 1/2 ∗ Pr[ExpA]b = 0
= 1/2 ∗ Pr[A(Trans, Ids, coin1) = 1] + 1/2 ∗ Pr[A(Trans, Ids, coin0) = 0]
= 1/2 ∗ Pr[A(Trans, Ids, coin1) = 1] + 1/2 ∗ (1− Pr[A(Trans, Ids, coin0) = 1]
<= 1/2 + 1/2.P r[A(Trans, Ids, coin1) = 1]–Pr[A(Trans, Ids, coin0 = 1]
Hence, all values of b1 and l occur with the same probability and this means
Pr(A(Trans, Ids, coin1 = 1)]−Pr[A(Trans, Ids, coin0) = 1 <<  where  is negligible.
Pr[ExpA] <= 1/2 + 
Note that the numbers β1 and β2 are very important, since using the coin once does
not allow identification of the Spender, but using it twice does. To see the effect of β1,
β2 suppose b1 is essentially removed from the process by taking β1=1. Then the Bank
could keep a list of values of c, along with the person corresponding to each c. When a
coin is deposited, the value of H would then be computed and compared with the list.
Probably there would be only one person for a given c, so the Bank could identify the
Spender[1, 9, 10, 12].
4.1.2 Unforgeability
Unforgeability means that the e-coin can only be generated by the Bank itself. We can’t
make or forge an e-coin by our own. If we want to make an unauthorized coin we need
to have αr=AzH(u,g,A). But this is a case of Discrete Logarithmic Problem which cant
be solved. So our e-cash scheme is unforgeable.[1, 11]
4.1.3 Double Spending Detection
Double spending detection is the mechanism of detecting if a coin is spent by the cus-
tomer twice. Suppose a customer uses the coin for Merchant M and again uses the same
coin for merchant N. Then it is the case of double spending detection; it is detected by
the help of properties file of coins. A coin is represented by six tuples(T, S,R, L, δ, ψ);
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all the information of the coin is stored in a properties file. Using the contents of this
properties file, we can detect the double spending[1, 10].
4.2 Attacks
4.2.1 Chosen Ciphertext Attack
In chosen ciphertext attack, attacker knows the deciphering algorithm and uses that
with many chosen ciphertexts. Comparing the results obtained from these cases, the
attacker obtains the plaintext. There are two types of chosen ciphertext attacks:
 Adaptive chosen ciphertext attack: Adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks are the
attacks in which attacker chooses a number of ciphertexts and obtains the corre-
sponding plaintexts. Using the relationship between the plaintext and ciphertext
pairs, we obtain the actual plaintext. So, adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks are
quite dangerous attacks. In this attack, in order to find the exact contents of ci-
phertext ‘c’, the attacker, using the deciphering algorithm, finds out the plain text
and ciphertext pairs. After that the attacker extracts the contents of the actual
ciphertext object c by the help of information obtained from plaintext-ciphertext
pairs.
 Indifferent chosen ciphertext attack: It is an attack model for cryptanalysis in
which the cryptanalyst gathers information, at least in part, by choosing a ci-
phertext and obtaining its decryption under an unknown key. In the attack, an
adversary has a chance to enter one or more known ciphertexts into the system
and obtain the resulting plaintexts. From these pieces of information the adversary
can attempt to recover the hidden secret key used for decryption.
There are three methods for immunizing, the first one is based on use of one-way hash
functions, the second on the use of universal hash functions and the third on the use of
digital signature schemes.
 Immunizing with one-way hash functions [13] : Here we immunize our e-cash
system against the CCA attacks by using one-way hash functions; some predefined
enciphering and deciphering algorithm are used for immunizing.
 Immunizing with universal hash functions [14, 15]: In this case, universal hash
functions are used for immunizing against CCA attacks.
 Immunizing with Digital Signature Schemes [16]: Based on DSA and one way hash
functions, we immunize against the CCA attacks.
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4.2.2 Key-only attack
It is an attack in which the secret key e is only known. If N is known, then X = CemodN
So, X can be found easily. So plaintext X can be found easily if the secret key is
known[2, 3].
4.2.3 Fogeary attack
This is used to forge signatures; strongly unforgeable signatures can be constructed
based on Computational Diffie Hellman(CDH). Using CDH it is possible to achieve
unforgeability [2, 3].
4.2.4 Man in the Middle Attack
It is an attack in which the another merchant N receives the payment from a customer
P which is intended for merchant M [2, 3].
4.2.5 Impersonation Attack
Merchants M and N try to deceive the customer. The customer has spent ‘x′ amount
but he is debited with ‘y′ amount by the merchants. One merchant impersonates other
merchant [2, 3].
Chapter 5
Conclusion and Future Scope
In our new e-cash scheme, we propose a new off-line electronic cash system which main-
tains the security features like anonymity, double spending, unforgeability. It is also
immune to various CCA attacks and can withstand them; it implements the tracing
protocol. We use three different protocols: account opening, payment and deposit pro-
tocol for the development of the e-cash system which can be used for secure payment
across internet and other networks. A secure e-cash system is the need of the hour
which incorporates all the security features in it and helps in the secure payments to the
merchants. It also takes care of the various attacks to which the e-cash is vulnerable
and tries to resist them; In a nutshell, this e-cash scheme facilitates payments to the
merchants and helps in exchange of merchandise also by implementing various protocols
for secure communication between the merchants and the customers as well as between
the merchants and the Bank.
In future research can be done on our scheme to lower its computation cost and com-
munication overhead. Also research can be done to incorporate time-stamping feature
to some of the highly proved secured signcryption schemes which can be applicable to
highly security sensitive application like e-bidding, e-voting, etransactions etc.
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